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This chapter examines the potential implications for the European Union and for EU-
Russian relations of recent developments in Russian economic policy. Its principal argument 
may be stated simply. A number of changes in Russian economic policy during 2003–05 
augur ill for both the further growth of its core resource-exporting sectors (especially oil and 
gas) and the further diversification of its production and export structure. On both counts, 
this is bad news for European Union member states. Europe has an obvious interest in the 
successful development of Russia’s resource sectors. It also has a less obvious, but no less 
compelling, interest in the evolution of Russia’s production and export structure in the 
direction of greater diversification and increased production of services and more 
sophisticated manufactures. It should be stressed at the outset that the chapter does not 
attempt to present a comprehensive picture of the EU-Russian economic relationship.2 Its 
focus is very much on Russian economic policy and performance and on the implications of 
Russia’s development for Europe. 
Asymmetry and energy 
Barysch (2004) suggests that the EU–Russia economic relationship can be summed up 
in just two words: asymmetry and energy. The asymmetry is, in the first instance, one of 
size: whatever its political significance, Russia is still a relatively small economic power. Its 
population of just under 144m is about one-third that of the EU and its GDP, at market 
exchange rates, is roughly equivalent to the combined GDP of Finland and Sweden, which 
together have a population of about 14.2m. Using World Bank purchasing-power-parity 
exchange rates,  which some have suggested are rather generous to Russia, Russia’s per 
capita GDP is under one-third of the European Union average.3 At market rates, it is about 
one-tenth. Russia accounts for about 2.4% of the world’s population, less than 2% of world 
exports and only around 0.3% of global flows of foreign direct investment. 
The economic relationship between Russia and the EU reflects this basic asymmetry. 
Whereas the EU is by far Russia’s must important trading partner – the EU 25 accounted for 
roughly 45% of Russian foreign trade turnover in 2004 – Russia accounted for just 3–4% of 
the EU total (excluding intra-EU trade) and was the Union’s fifth-largest trading partner after 
the United States, Switzerland, Japan and China. Over three-quarters of foreign investment 
in Russia originates in the EU. However – contrary to what many estate agents in 
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Kensington and the Côte d’Azur might think – Russia is a negligible source of foreign 
investment in the EU. 
Underlying this asymmetry of size is an asymmetry of economic structure. Fuel, metals 
and other raw materials account for around 70% of Russian exports to the rest of the world 
and for an even higher share of exports to the European Union.4 By contrast, Russian imports 
are dominated by manufactured goods. While the commodity structure of Russian-EU trade 
undoubtedly reflects certain complementarities between the two, it has also caused some 
concern in Russia and is regarded by some observers as having ‘a “colonial” tinge’.5 
Russia as a resource-based economy 
Structure 
Before trying to assess the major drivers of Russian growth and possible future 
development paths, it is necessary to clarify Russia’s economic structure, which is not what 
it appears to be in the official data. The official national accounts, though technically correct, 
present a somewhat distorted picture of the Russian economy. This is because the 
widespread use of transfer pricing causes a large share of the value added generated by 
natural resource sectors to appear not in the accounts of the extraction enterprises, but in the 
accounts of their affiliated trading companies. This would be no great problem if Russian 
companies presented consolidated accounts or if the statistical authorities themselves 
corrected for transfer pricing. As things stand, however, export-oriented industries have long 
been significantly under-represented in industrial production, and industry as a whole is 
under-represented in the national accounts. Wholesale trade and hence the service sector as a 
whole are over-represented. There have recently been several attempts to estimate the size of 
these distortions and correct for them. This chapter relies on the recent World Bank estimates 
of the relative weights of different sectors in GDP.6  The differences between the World 
Bank and official weights are shown in figures 1 and 2.  
The contrast between the two GDP structures shown in figure 1 has important 
implications for Russia’s growth potential. The official statistics suggest that Russia’s 
service sector accounts for roughly 60% of GDP, only marginally below the 65–70% typical 
of the most advanced OECD economies. This is difficult to credit, given that most services 
in Russia are still relatively under-developed. This apparent contradiction disappears when 
correcting for transfer pricing: the share of industry increases to 41% and the services share 
drops to 45%, which seems far more plausible. This is not by any means bad news. Hitherto, 
services have tended to grow faster than GDP, as Russia’s economic structure has changed in 
response to the shift from central planning to the market. Services have grown faster than 
total output because they were neglected by central planners. If the services share really had 
reached 60% or more, then the scope for further rapid services growth would be limited: the 
period of ‘catch-up’ growth in services would be over. However, the fact that the service 
sector is actually less developed than it appears in the official data means that there is still 
considerable scope for catch-up. The service sector should continue to grow strongly with 
increasing living standards, if provided with the right conditions, and hence could enhance 
Russia’s growth potential for some years to come. 
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Source : Ahrend (2004), based on Goskomstat, World Bank and OECD calculations.
GDP  2003, current basic prices GDP  2003, current basic prices, WB weighted
Figure 1. Structure of GDP
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The implications of figure 2 are less reassuring. The World Bank weights show that 
Russia’s industrial sector is more narrowly based than it appears to be in the official data. 
The fuel sector alone accounted for almost half of value-added in industry in 2003, while 
energy and metals together accounted for an estimated 69%.  
Source : Russian Federal Service for State Statistics, World Bank and OECD calculations.
Figure 2. Structure of industrial output
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This dependence on a narrow range of natural resources is one of the main reasons why 
many observers remain sceptical of Russia’s capacity for sustained growth over the long 
term. There is now a large body of empirical research which suggests that resource-
dependent economies tend to grow more slowly and to experience greater volatility in their 
economic performance.7 It would be a mistake to view this ‘resource curse’ in overly 
deterministic terms: most of the problems associated with resource-dependent development 
can be substantially mitigated, if not avoided, given appropriate policies.8 Nevertheless, 
resource dependence presents policy-makers with a particular set of challenges, including 
vulnerability to external shocks, ‘Dutch disease’ and the various institutional pathologies 
which are often associated with resource-dependent development. Resource dependence also 
looms large in any discussion of structural reforms, as resource-dependent development can 
complicate efforts to build new institutions. There are thus good reasons for seeing Russia’s 
economic structure as a problem. 
Performance 
The adjusted sectoral weights presented above provide the basis for an assessment of 
Russia’s recent growth that differs substantially from that suggested by the official national 
accounts. Growth immediately after the crisis was overwhelmingly driven by industry and 
construction, but the importance of service-sector growth increased, especially in 2002–03. 
Even on the adjusted weights, services accounted for roughly one-third of economic growth 
in 1999–2003. However, industry and construction accounted for the bulk of Russian growth 
during 1999–2004.9 Industrial growth, moreover, has been dominated by natural resource 
sectors, particularly the oil sector. During 2001–04, natural resource sectors accounted for 
around 70% of the growth of industrial production, with the oil sector contributing by far the 
largest share of this (figure 3).  
Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics, World Bank and OECD calculations.
Figure 3.  Percentage of contribution of resource-related 
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It is thus clear that the contribution of the oil industry to economic growth was far 
larger over the period than the official data imply. If industry accounted for slightly below 
half of GDP growth over the period and the oil sector for somewhat below half of industrial 
growth, then the direct contribution of the oil sector to growth appears to have been about 
one-quarter. Taking into account the knock-on effects from oil-sector procurement and 
wages on domestic demand, the actual contribution of the oil industry to economic growth 
would have been greater still. Gurvich (2005) estimates the oil sector’s total contribution to 
growth, including indirect effects, at over one-third. 
This resource-dominated industrial structure is also reflected in Russia’s export profile: 
in 2004, hydrocarbons, metals, food and other raw materials made up 70% of Russia’s export 
bill, with oil and gas alone accounting for 48% (figure 4). Strongly increasing oil exports 
also drove the expansion in export volumes that allowed a consumption boom to unfold and 
to be sustained throughout the period without putting the external balance at risk. As figure 5 
shows, oil was the only major export commodity to show above-average growth in volume 
terms during 2000–04. 
Source:  United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), SITC Rev 3.
Figure 4. Structure of Russian exports, 2004
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Figure 5. Export growth by commodity
Source:  United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), SITC Rev 3, Goskomstat, Datastream, Moscow Narodny 
Bank, OECD calculations and estimates.
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Complementarities or contradictions? 
Russia’s resource potential is the basis for much EU policy towards Russia. The focus 
on energy, in particular, is hardly surprising, given the EU’s desire for reliable energy 
supplies from its eastern neighbour and Russia’s awareness of the political leverage it can 
sometimes exercise in view of its energy wealth. In any case, a relationship in which Russian 
resource exports (primarily, but not only, energy) are traded for European manufactures 
would appear to reflect the two parties’ revealed comparative advantages. However, this 
relationship is not without its contradictions. As Hamilton (2003) argues, this pattern of 
revealed comparative advantage is in part the result of EU policies. Of course, the Union is 
hardly responsible for the very narrow range of products in which Russia has a significant 
revealed comparative advantage, but, at the margins, EU policies have tended to reinforce 
the resource-sector bias of Russian development and thus to aggravate potential ‘Dutch 
disease’ problems. Moreover, while well aware of the geopolitical significance of its 
resource wealth, Russia’s rulers nevertheless aspire to something more than a trading 
relationship based on raw materials exports and imports of manufactures. The Russian 
authorities are committed to diversifying the country’s production and export structure. They 
are also increasingly interested in the geographic diversification of its resource exports, 
which implies that less will be available for European markets. Certainly, there are plenty of 
non-EU consumers with a keen interest in Russian energy, including China, Japan and the 
United States. 
Yet it is not only Russian policymakers who have an interest in changing that country’s 
worryingly resource-heavy economic structure. Europe itself needs a more diversified 
Russia. While Europe’s overriding interest in Russian energy and raw materials dominates 
much policy now, the Union is likely to be far better off over the long run with a more 
diversified Russia, for several reasons.  
• A more diversified Russia is more likely to be democratic and stable. A good deal of the 
resource curse literature links resource-dependent development to corruption and 
undemocratic governance,10 and common sense suggests that, given Russia’s population 
and human capital endowments, a flourishing non-resource urban sector is likely to be 
crucial to long-term social and political stability. As Sutela (2005b) observes, Russia can 
never become a northerly Kuwait: its resource sectors alone will never be able to provide 
an acceptable standard of living for the great mass of the population, even if one makes 
very aggressive assumptions about both future resource prices and Russia’s ability to 
increase resource extraction.  
• A more diversified Russia is likely to import more from the EU – and to import not 
merely consumer goods but machinery, equipment and other investment goods. It is also 
likely to be a more promising market for European providers of financial and other 
business services.  
• A more diversified Russia is less likely, on balance, to be a source of illegal immigration 
and other ‘social bads’ that the EU now fears from the East, for at least two reasons. 
First, a more economically diversified Russia is likely to be better able to provide jobs 
and welfare for the vast majority of its citizens who are not employed in resource 
industries. Secondly, a Russia that remains a ‘resource-producing appendage’ of the 
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world economy is more likely to experience very high concentrations of wealth and to 
leave a large part of its population with relatively limited economic prospects. At the 
same time, a more diversified Russia is likely to have better quality institutions more 
generally, and thus to be better equipped to deal with the kind of social ills associated 
with relative deprivation.  
There need not be a serious problem here. For Russia, there should be no contradiction 
between the twin imperatives of successfully developing its resource-exporting sectors and 
fostering the diversification of economic activity over the longer term. Addressing this two-
fold challenge will require continued adherence to sound macroeconomic policies, the 
creation of a stable, transparent and investor-friendly framework for governing the major 
resource sectors, and the completion of a range of structural reforms designed to create an 
environment conducive to investment in non-resource sectors and thus to facilitate greater 
diversification.11 At the margins, the EU could support such a process by abandoning – as it 
has already begun to do in certain areas – some of the policies that impede Russian efforts to 
diversify exports to EU markets.  
Russia’s strategic choices 
The problem with the path just outlined is that it may take too long for the Russian 
authorities’ liking. There is considerable political pressure within Russia to force the pace of 
economic diversification, if necessary by means of highly interventionist industrial policies. 
At the same time, recent years have seen a steady drift towards a much more étatiste 
approach to the management of large-scale industry, particularly the fuel sector. This 
combination bodes ill for the future, since it is unlikely to deliver the kind of results that 
either Russia or the Union would desire over the longer term. The question of how Russia 
attempts to manage both its resource sectors and its diversification strategies is thus of 
cardinal importance. 
In theory, at least, policy towards the resource and non-resource economies do not have 
to move in lockstep. The drive towards greater state ownership and control need not 
encompass the non-resource economy. The state might try to create different institutions for, 
and to pursue different policies towards, the non-resource sector. As noted above, Russia is 
too big to prosper on the basis of natural resources alone. It needs a successful secondary 
sector. One danger is that protection and subsidies will be used to foster the development of 
this ‘B’ sector, as Sutela (2005b:4) calls it. Resource-exporting states have often used 
resource rents to sustain such a secondary urban sector via explicit or implicit subsidies or 
protection.12 Such a dependent urban sector tends to be a drag on growth and can also 
constitute a barrier to economic reform, since it sustains a social constituency with a vested 
interest in the status quo.13  
                                                     
11. For a detailed discussion of the policies required, see OECD (2004), chapter 1.  
12. Auty (1994, 2004), Mahon (1992).   
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the overview of this literature in Ross (1999:310–11). See also Gelb et al. (1988) and 
Treisman (2002) on ‘dependent urbanisation’. 
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Russia in the 1990s was arguably a case in point. A large part of Russian industry was 
kept afloat via subsidies throughout the first decade of transition.14 This reflected both the 
power of industrial managers as a lobby and fear of the social consequences of structural 
change. Direct subsidies from the budget and soft credits from the central bank had largely 
been eliminated by the mid-nineties, but they were increasingly replaced by implicit 
subsidies provided largely by the state-controlled gas and electricity monopolies.15 However, 
the first post-crisis years saw a marked shift away from the subsidy-dependent 
industrialisation model. Since 2000, there has been the dramatic reduction in the implicit 
subsidies provided to Russian industries and households. As OECD (2004) shows, the gas 
and electricity subsidies have been diminishing rapidly in recent years, while Russian 
enterprises’ payment discipline – with respect to the budget, employees and suppliers – has 
greatly improved. The authorities have devoted considerable energy to trying to create 
conditions for the development of an open and competitive sector of small and medium-sized 
businesses. While its ‘de-bureaucratisation’ policies have not been wholly successful, they 
have brought about a significant reduction in the burden of red tape and bureaucratic rent-
seeking on small business (CEFIR, 2005). 
At the risk of grossly oversimplifying the situation, Russia can choose among four 
broad approaches to the economy, corresponding to more market-oriented and more dirigiste 
lines of policy with respect to the ‘A’ and ‘B’ sectors (table 1). A consistently liberal policy 
would give priority to private entrepreneurship and market forces in both spheres, while 
dirigisme in both domains would look disturbingly like the Soviet past. Neither of these two 
options appears likely at present, although the latter fortunately seems to be even less 
probable than the former. A third option would allow private owners to continue to run 
resources sectors (and to capture a large share of resource rents) with minimal interference 
from the state, but would involve state support, in the form of protection, investment or 
subsidies, for ‘priority’ manufacturing sectors. This is precisely the approach for which 
many Russian financial-industrial groups lobbied in the 1990s, and I have therefore labelled 
it ‘industrial policy for oligarchs’. Finally, the state could tighten its grip on the resource 
industries (and perhaps also on selected manufacturing and other sectors) while adopting a 
broadly market-friendly approach to the rest of the economy. There are clear echoes here of 
the 1920s-era New Economic Policy (NEP), which left the state in control of the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy but allowed capitalism to flourish on a small scale. 
Table 1. The elements of policy towards a two-sector economy 
   Policy towards the non-resource economy 
  Liberal Interventionist 
Private-sector/market-driven Consistent liberalism Industrial policy for oligarchs 
Policy towards the natural 
resource sectors 
State-directed NEP for the 21st century Back to the future? 
    
  
                                                     
14. Trade protection played less of a role. On the whole, Russia’s secondary sector enjoyed 
surprisingly little formal protection – trade policy since 1992 has generally been fairly 
liberal – although informal barriers are sometimes considerable.   
15. Enterprises also ‘borrowed’ increasingly from workers, the state and other suppliers, via 
wage, tax and payment arrears. For details, see Woodruff (1999) and Tompson (1999). For 
an estimate of the scale of this implicit subsidy in the early post-crisis period, see OECD 
(2002:121–32). 
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The last of these four options – the neo-NEP – seems to reflect, however, imperfectly, 
the direction of policy in 2003–05. Of course, it would be foolish to expect too much 
consistency in economic policy – there are, and will continue to be, zigs and zags – but the 
21st-century NEP model looks increasingly like a better fit than the others, including the 
‘consistent liberalism’ which largely characterised the years prior to 2003. At the very least, 
it can be argued that such an option is now politically viable. This, in itself, marks a major 
change. Prior to mid-2003 or so, there was really no viable alternative to the more or less 
consistent liberalism enshrined in the reform programme devised at the beginning of the 
Putin presidency under the guidance of Economic Development and Trade Minister German 
Gref. Gref did not always get his way, nor was policy always consistent, but opposition to 
reform was just that: opposition. Gref’s opponents resisted reform. They stalled some 
measures, altered others and managed to block many altogether. But they had no coherent 
rival programme to advance: ‘Gref-ism’ was, for better or worse, the only game in town – as, 
indeed, market reform had been throughout the Yeltsin era. Since mid-2003, however, a kind 
of neo-NEP has been in play. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, there is a real (if 
unattractive) alternative to liberal reform on offer, not merely an obstructive opposition.16 
Given the dual structure of the Russian economy, there is not necessarily a 
contradiction between continued efforts to create better conditions for private entrepreneurs 
in the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector and the state’s growing role in the 
management of large-scale industry. There are, however, good reasons to doubt whether 
such a ‘neo-NEP’ can work in practice. First, much of the non-resource sector will continue 
to push for protection and, given its socio-political importance and economic weakness, it 
may get it. Yet such protection is more likely to impede than to facilitate the development of 
new activities and products that might be more competitive. Secondly, as Sutela observes, 
the dividing line between the ‘A’ and ‘B’ sectors is fluid and actions taken with respect to 
the former could have unexpected knock-on effects for the latter. To take but one recent 
example, the central authorities’ use of the tax service and the prosecutors against the 
country’s largest private company does appear to have encouraged lower-level officials to 
step up the pressure on small and medium businesses. Finally, there is a very real danger 
arising from the fact that the notion of ‘strategic’ sectors is proving rather elastic and may 
come to be applied to an ever larger part of the economy – as already appears to be 
happening in fields like autos, metallurgy, machine-building, aviation and even banking.  
One can take the argument here a step further by exploring Russia’s ability to pursue 
any of the four policy options outlined above. Table 2 provides an assessment of where 
Russia stands with respect to each of 15 institutional and policy variables. The scores range 
from ‘strong’ (white) through ‘medium’ (grey) to ‘weak’ (black). The arrows indicate 
whether the situation with respect to each variable improved (↑), deteriorated (↓) or remained 
about the same (↔) over the course of 2003–04. This assessment is based on an informal 
survey of 35 Russian and western specialists on the Russian economy in early 2005. While 
one cannot claim that the sample was representative of any particular group, there were 
roughly equal numbers of Russians and westerners among the respondents, who included 
academic researchers, officials of both national governments and multilateral institutions, 
and investment bank analysts. These assessments are not necessarily ‘true’ in any sense, but 
they undoubtedly reflect a substantial segment of expert opinion. On the vast majority of 
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variables, moreover, there was a high degree of consensus with respect to both level and 
trend. 
Table 2. Where are we now? 
 Russia 2005 (Consensus View)* 
Quality of macroeconomic management STRONG – No change (↔) 
Human capital / education levels MEDIUM – No change (↔) 
State capacity for taxation and redistribution MEDIUM – Improving (↑) 
Contracting environment (ability to conclude & enforce private contracts) MEDIUM  – No change (↔) 
Protection of property rights – security from private predation MEDIUM  – No change (↔) 
Business climate for large enterprises MEDIUM – Deteriorating (↓) 
Levels of investment MEDIUM – Deteriorating (↓) 
FDI levels WEAK – No change (↔) 
Business climate for SMEs WEAK – No change/Improving (↔↑)  
Protection of property rights – security from state predation WEAK – Deteriorating (↓)  
Physical infrastructure WEAK – No change (↔) 
Civil society WEAK – Deteriorating (↓) 
State bureaucracy – probity (non-corruptness) WEAK – No change/Deteriorating (↔↓) 
State bureaucracy – administrative capacity WEAK – No change (↔) 
Protection of intellectual property rights WEAK – No change (↔) 
*The ‘consensus view’ is based on an informal survey of around 35 Russian and western experts, including officials, academics and private-sector analysts. 
  
Table 3 reproduces the scores found in table 1 and sets them alongside an (admittedly 
somewhat rough-and-ready) assessment of the institutional requirements of four possible 
lines of policy. Again, white is ‘strong’ and black ‘weak’. Intermediate shades of grey reflect 
borderlines. The ‘market-driven/natural resource’ strategy basically represents a continuation 
of the policies pursued towards the oil sector in 2000–03, while the ‘state-directed’ variant of 
the same reflects the prospect of a far greater role for state ownership and intervention in 
resource sectors. Given that economic diversification is unlikely to be entirely spontaneous, 
the strategies towards the non-resource economy are labelled ‘state-assisted diversification’ 
and ‘state-directed diversification’. The former would place greatest emphasis on general 
framework conditions for business but would also leave some scope for limited interventions 
to address particular market failures that might impede innovation or diversification. The 
latter more closely resembles traditional ‘industrial policy’, emphasising state support for, or 
even investment in, ‘priority sectors’. To put it somewhat crudely, one might think of Chile 
as pursuing state-assisted diversification, while South Korea’s strategy a generation ago 
would come under the head of state-directed diversification. 
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Table 3. Potential engines of development 
 Natural resource – state directed 
Natural resource – 
market driven 
‘State- 
assisted’  
diversification 
‘State- 
directed’ 
diversification 
Quality of macroeconomic management S S MS MS 
Human capital / education levels M M MS MS 
State capacity for taxation and redistribution W S M M 
Contracting environment (ability to conclude & 
enforce private contracts) W M S S 
Protection of property rights – security from private 
predation W WM S S 
Business climate for large enterprises W WM S M 
Levels of investment S S S S 
FDI levels S WM S S 
Business climate for SMEs W W S M 
Protection of property rights – security from state 
predation W S MS MS 
Physical infrastructure M M M M 
Civil society M S M M 
State bureaucracy – probity (non-corruptness) W M S MS 
State bureaucracy – administrative capacity M WM M S 
Protection of intellectual property rights W W M M 
  
These tables undoubtedly do represent something of a ‘back of the envelope’ exercise. 
The judgements found in virtually every cell are contestable. However, while it may not be 
rigorously scientific, this exercise can nevertheless help to clarify ideas about the challenges 
facing Russia and the strategies it might want to pursue over the long term. Even so, a few 
specific caveats are in order. First, the categories in table 3 are clearly rather stylised 
descriptions of Russia’s potential development strategies. Secondly, it would be a mistake to 
regard them all as equally promising. In particular, both the state directed resource-based 
strategy and the dirigiste approach to diversification are likely to deliver poorer outcomes 
over the longer term, but both seem to have their advocates in Russia. Thirdly, there is 
undoubtedly scope for debate about the ‘requirements’ of these strategies. In general, 
however, the judgements made on this point are not difficult to justify. For example, the less 
diversified the economy, the smaller the authorities’ margin of error when it comes to 
macroeconomic management; as long as Russia remains so heavily reliant on a few resource 
sectors, sound macro policies will be absolutely crucial. Similarly, it is not difficult to see 
why more étatiste strategies are less demanding with respect to property rights and the 
contracting environment for private players. However, they are probably even more 
dependent on the quality and probity of the state administration than the market-driven 
strategies. A market-oriented strategy that aims to foster economic diversification, in 
particular, implies greater demands on state capacities and tougher requirements with respect 
to the quality of institutions. 
Table 4 highlights the interaction between the survey results and the notional 
development strategies set out in table 3. Essentially, the white cells represent instances 
where Russia currently meets the requirements of a given strategy for a given variable. 
Coloured cells indicate shortfalls. The darker the cell, the further Russia is from the requisite 
value. The arrows indicate whether Russia has recently been approaching (↑) or diverging 
from (↓) that value.  
WILLIAM TOMPSON 
 12
Table 4. How far to go? 
The darker the box, the greater the gap between Russia’s current score and the requirements of the strategy. (White 
indicates that Russia already meets or exceeds a strategy’s estimated requirement for a given variable.) 
 
Natural 
resource –  
state directed 
Natural 
resource - 
market driven 
State-Assisted 
diversification 
State-directed 
diversification 
Quality of macroeconomic management S ↔ S ↔ S ↔ S ↔ 
Human capital / education levels M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ 
State capacity for taxation and redistribution M ↑ M ↑ M ↑ M ↑ 
Contracting environment (ability to conclude & enforce private 
contracts) M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ 
Protection of property rights - security from private predation M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ M ↔ 
Business climate for large enterprises M ↓ M ↓ M ↓ M ↓ 
Levels of investment M ↓ M ↓ M ↓ M ↓ 
FDI levels W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ 
Business climate for SMEs W ↔↑ W ↔↑ W ↔↑ W ↔↑ 
Protection of property rights - security from state predation W ↓ W ↓ W ↓ W ↓ 
Physical infrastructure W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ 
Civil society W ↓ W ↓ W ↓ W ↓ 
State bureaucracy - probity (non-corruptness) W ↔↓ W ↔↓ W ↔↓ W ↔↓ 
State bureaucracy - administrative capacity W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ 
Protection of intellectual property rights W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ W ↔ 
  
 
Table 4 gives rise to a number of observations. The first is simply that, if the tables are 
an even remotely accurate approximation of the institutional requirements for the various 
development paths, then Russia is not very well equipped for any of the more demanding 
strategies. Moreover, there are signs of deterioration in some of the areas in which it most 
needs to make progress. The Russian authorities are rightly concerned with diversifying the 
structure of production and exports, but the Russian state is not well equipped to pursue a 
successful diversification strategy, whether liberal or dirigiste. The institutional weaknesses 
identified above impinge directly on the state’s ability to devise, adopt and implement any 
policies that make significant demands on the probity or administrative capacities of the 
state. Thus, whatever the merits of the various proposals for a more activist industrial policy 
– and some of them are far more market-friendly than others17 – there remain good reasons 
to be sceptical of the bureaucracy’s ability to implement them.  
Secondly, although the authorities talk about diversification a great deal, what the state 
has actually been doing since mid-2003 corresponds most closely to the state-directed 
resource-sector strategy. A glance at table 4 suggests one reason for this trend: the state is 
doing what it is best equipped to do. This is not to deny the importance of other factors 
driving policy towards the oil industry, in particular, and large-scale industry in general: 
factional, personal, commercial, geopolitical and ideological factors have all played a role in 
recent policy changes. However, it would be a mistake to overlook the role of the Russian 
state’s institutional weaknesses in shaping policy. A state that finds it difficult to tax and 
regulate effectively will have correspondingly greater incentives to rely on direct control 
rather than contract, regulation and taxation. In the case of Russia, these incentives were 
probably all the greater precisely because, whatever its other weaknesses, the Russian state 
possesses coercive capacities that are arguably out of all proportion to any of its other 
capabilities. Unfortunately, the very institutional weaknesses that may predispose Russia to 
pursue a more interventionist strategy make it less likely to run state-owned companies well. 
Addressing these institutional weaknesses must, in the long run, be more profitable than 
adapting to them. 
                                                     
17.  See, e.g. Drebentsov (2004).  
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Thirdly, the survey results point to deterioration in some of the areas in which Russia 
most needs to make progress. Overall, the survey results show two rising arrows, indicating 
improvement over the course of 2004 (one of which is qualified as a result of a statistical 
dead heat). There are downward arrows, indicating deterioration, for five variables (one 
qualified). While there are no corresponding results for earlier years, it is very likely that 
assessments given during the period from early 2000 to early 2004 would not only have been 
more positive with respect to the levels of some of the variables (that is clear from the 
number of falling arrows), but they would probably also have received more positive ratings 
with respect to trends. That is worrying.  
Fourthly, many areas are in need of substantial improvement regardless of the strategic 
direction Russia takes. This implies that a very large part of the structural reform agenda 
should, in principal at least, be relatively non-controversial, in so far as it consists of things 
Russia needs to do no matter what development path its leaders might favour. Yet there 
appears to be no consensus about even such base-line reforms as civil service reform; the last 
two years have seen very little progress on any of these issues. 
To sum up, the Russian state currently performs its most fundamental domestic tasks, 
from law enforcement to social service provision, relatively poorly. In the absence of a major 
improvement in its ability to fulfil these essential functions, it is unlikely to be very 
successful in tackling more technically demanding policy challenges. Even the less 
demanding lines of policy outlined above are likely to prove problematic. It follows from 
this that activist industrial policies should not be seen as a shortcut to diversification. They 
will not allow Russia to bypass the slow, difficult work of reforming the state and creating 
better framework conditions for business. On the contrary, even the most promising ‘new-
style’ industrial policies are unlikely to succeed unless these basic issues are resolved. 
The implications for Europe 
What, then, does all this imply for Europe? To begin with, a more étatiste approach to 
resource sectors may well create new opportunities for some European companies. Prospects 
for foreign involvement in Russia’s resource sectors – which have always been limited – 
have been further clouded in 2005 by the authorities’ evident determination to ensure that 
‘strategic’ mineral deposits are developed by majority Russian-owned entities. However, 
Russia’s state-owned companies appear interested in attracting foreign partners to join them 
in major projects, and at least some in government view foreign partners as one way of 
mitigating the well known inefficiencies of some of Russia’s major state companies. The 
modalities of such foreign involvement are another matter. While it remains to be seen 
exactly what formal restrictions on non-residents’ investment will in fact be adopted (and, 
indeed, how ‘non-resident’ entities will be identified), it is clear that foreign companies will 
be relegated to secondary – though potentially lucrative – roles for the foreseeable future.   
Unfortunately, such an approach to Russia’s resource sectors – and, in particular, to its 
oil and gas sectors – bodes ill for Europe’s future energy supply. Greater state control over 
Russian hydrocarbons production is likely to lead to less efficiency, slower output growth 
(and hence slower growth of exports) and more rent-seeking in this critical sector. The 
state’s growing role in the petroleum sector also increases the likelihood that geopolitical 
concerns rather than commercial considerations will shape the industry’s development. 
Russia would hardly be the first oil and gas producer to use its hydrocarbon wealth for 
political leverage, but this would still be bad news for Europe as well as for Russia. The 
evidence to date suggests that the growing focus on geopolitical concerns has led to greater 
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uncertainty about, and inconsistency in, state policy. This, in turn, makes investment 
planning, by state or private companies, more difficult.18 
Europe also needs to consider the possible consequences of a Russian diversification 
strategy based on cheap energy. Given the importance the Russian authorities attach to 
developing their manufacturing sector, it would be a mistake to assume that such a large 
share of Russia’s hydrocarbon production will always be available for export. This is 
particularly true with respect to natural gas: it has been suggested that Russia could best 
exploit its gas wealth by using it as the basis to develop its comparative advantage in energy-
intensive manufactures.19 This would imply a tightening of energy supply conditions in 
Europe, as well as raising the prospect of rather acrimonious disputes over market access for 
Russian manufactured exports, since EU producers would probably seek to argue that lower 
domestic energy prices constituted a subsidy. However, it would be very difficult for the EU 
to make such a case under WTO rules once Russia entered the organisation.20  
Finally, there are the potential implications for Europe of a Russia that, after a period of 
very rapid growth, ultimately becomes a chronic under-performer. A Russia pursuing a mix 
of half-hearted liberal reforms and NEP-like interventions in ‘strategic’ sectors would not 
necessarily stagnate, but such policies would probably be a formula for slower growth over 
the longer term, frustrating Russian hopes of rapid convergence with West European living 
standards and levels of per capita output. A less diversified Russia, reliant on a clutch of 
state-dominated resource sectors, would probably be poorer, more authoritarian and more 
likely to remain a significant exporter of ‘social bads’ to the EU. 
Conclusion 
The conclusions which flow from the foregoing may be stated simply as follows. 
Europe has an interest in continued market reforms in Russia. Russia’s current strong growth 
and favourable terms of trade should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the country’s 
longer-term future depends to a significant degree on the readiness of the authorities to press 
ahead with the kind of reforms outlined in the Gref package of 2000. Such reforms are 
important to Europe’s energy security, of course, but they are also important to the success 
of Russia’s non-resource economy. Europe has a vested interest in the success of Russian 
diversification efforts, as well as in the growth of Russia’s resource sectors. This being the 
case, the Union and its member states should be disturbed by recent developments. They 
should also be increasingly wary of relying on Russian energy to meet Europe’s needs over 
the long term. 
                                                     
18. The years of debate over the planned Far Eastern oil pipeline illustrate the problem well.   
19. World Bank (2005:11–13).  
20.  Provided domestic energy prices were above long-run cost-recovery levels, it would be 
debatable whether or not they constituted a subsidy at all. Even if they did, however, they 
would not fall afoul WTO rules unless they were linked to foreign trade activity. Low 
domestic energy prices, which affected all producers and which thus reduced the price of 
both exported and domestically consumed goods, could not form the basis for a claim 
under WTO rules. See OECD (2004), annex 3.1 for details on WTO rules and Russian 
energy pricing.  
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